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Abstract—Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) are com-
monly leveraged by malware to create lists of domain names
which can be used for command and control (C&C) purposes.
Approaches based on machine learning have recently been
developed to automatically detect generated domain names in
real-time. In this work, we present a novel DGA called CharBot
which is capable of producing large numbers of unregistered
domain names that are not detected by state-of-the-art classifiers
for real-time detection of DGAs, including the recently published
methods FANCI (a random forest based on human-engineered
features) and LSTM.MI (a deep learning approach). CharBot
is very simple, effective and requires no knowledge of the
targeted DGA classifiers. We show that retraining the classifiers
on CharBot samples is not a viable defense strategy. We believe
these findings show that DGA classifiers are inherently vulnerable
to adversarial attacks if they rely only on the domain name
string to make a decision. Designing a robust DGA classifier may,
therefore, necessitate the use of additional information besides the
domain name alone. To the best of our knowledge, CharBot is the
simplest and most efficient black-box adversarial attack against
DGA classifiers proposed to date.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of distributing malware is often to extract
sensitive information from victim machines or to use them
for disseminating spam. To achieve this, botmasters need to
be able to communicate with the infected machines, which is
done via command-and-control (C&C) servers. The use of a
fixed pool of C&C servers is not attractive, however, since
these servers may be taken offline or blacklisted. Therefore,
malware authors design domain generation algorithms or
DGAs to automatically create many domain names that are
likely to be unregistered and hence available for the malware
to establish a communication channel [1]. A DGA makes use
of a seed, i.e., some random number that is accessible to both
the botmaster and the malware on the infected machines.
Possible seeds include the current date, trending topics on
Twitter, weather forecasts, etc. Once this seed has been fixed,
the botmaster, as well as all of the infected machines, can
generate the same list of domains. The botmaster registers one
of these domains and waits for the malware to successfully
resolve a DNS query against it. From that point on, commu-
nication can take place. Should the C&C server ever be taken
offline or have its domain blacklisted, this process can simply
be restarted and a new C&C server can be established.
An extensive amount of research in the past decade has
been devoted to the development of methods for detection
of domains generated by DGAs [2]–[5]. These methods can
be roughly divided into two classes: (1) classifiers that detect
DGAs based solely on the domain name itself; and (2) classi-
fiers that use some sort of context information, such as IP
addresses of the source, traffic, and query patterns by the
infected machines. Our focus in this paper is on the first kind
of classifiers, i.e. techniques that can detect DGA domains in
real-time based on the domain name string. These systems
are particularly attractive since additional information beyond
the domain name string can be expensive to acquire. It might
also simply not be available due to privacy concerns. Another
significant advantage of systems that perform DGA detection
based solely on the domain name is their potential use in
real-time systems, blocking malicious domains before they are
actually resolved. Accordingly, much research has been carried
out to prevent this type of C&C communication using systems
that can detect in real-time whether a domain name is likely
generated by a DGA or not [2], [4]–[13].
Such DGA classifiers need to be sufficiently robust so that
they can still reliably detect DGA domains even when the
DGAs start generating lists from seeds that were not seen
during training. Existing work in this area is comprised both of
methods that make use of human-engineered features as well
as deep learning techniques which learn to extract relevant
features automatically. We show in this paper that both kinds
of methods are inherently vulnerable to simple attacks and
hence the use of side information may be crucial to developing
robust DGA classifiers. Specifically, we introduce a new and
effective DGA called CharBot. It is a simplistic character-
based DGA (hence the name) that generates domain names
by randomly modifying two characters in well known benign
domains collected from the Alexa top domain names.1 We
find that the domains CharBot generates are almost always
unregistered, hence available for C&C communication.
To demonstrate CharBot’s capabilities, we attack two types
of recently proposed prototypical DGA classifiers that are con-
sidered state-of-the-art at the time of this writing: (1) a random
forest (RF) model called FANCI based on human-engineered
1https://alexa.com/topsites. Accessed: 2019-02-10.
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2features extracted from the domain name [11] and (2) a deep
neural network (DNN) model called LSTM.MI [5]. We also
test a RF approach called B-RF based on the features proposed
in [12]. We train these models on data sets consisting of benign
and malicious domain names. The benign names originate
from the Alexa top domain names. For the malicious domains,
we use the OSINT Bambenek Consulting feeds.2 We find that
the domain names generated by CharBot go largely undetected
by all these state-of-the-art DGA classifiers.
We attempt to harden the classifiers against CharBot by
incorporating samples from it in the training data sets and
retraining the models. Although this strategy does increase
the detection rates, they are still not high enough to be
practical. We also try retraining using samples generated by
DeepDGA — a state of the art generative model for malicious
domain names [14] — as well as the DeceptionDGA by
Spooren et al. [15], but we find that this does not adequately
help with detecting CharBot. CharBot is much simpler than
both DeepDGA and DeceptionDGA: DeepDGA is a deep
learning approach, whereas CharBot performs only simple
string manipulations; DeceptionDGA is designed to evade
classifiers based on human-engineered features. By contrast,
CharBot is fully black-box: it does not require any details of
the models being attacked.
CharBot works by corrupting domain names from the Alexa
top domains, so it is natural to ask whether the domains
it generates can also be used to successfully attack DGA
classifiers that do not depend on Alexa for training. To answer
this question, we investigate whether the DGA classifiers can
be hardened by replacing the Alexa data set by an alternative
data set of benign domains during training. To this end, we
use a data set of domain names that occurred in real DNS
traffic, weakly labeled according to heuristic rules [7]. We find
that training on this different data set yields approximately the
same results as when training on Alexa. This supports the idea
that CharBot attacks are transferable across models and data
sets.
These findings expose a dangerous weakness in modern
DGA classifiers: they can be circumvented using a simple
algorithm and they cannot be easily trained to detect it well.
We speculate that this weakness is inherent in any model
that relies solely on domain name strings to perform DGA
classification. CharBot works by introducing a small number
of typographical errors in benign domain names from the
Alexa data set. As such, the statistical properties of the names
it generates will be almost identical to those of the Alexa
domains. This makes it nearly impossible for a classifier
to draw any significant distinction between Alexa names
and CharBot names. Moreover, any other set of legitimate
domains that should be accepted by a classifier with high
probability could in principle be used instead of Alexa by a
CharBot attack. Therefore, we do not believe these attacks can
be mitigated without relying on additional side information.
Such information might include the IP addresses the domains
resolve to, how many times the domains were queried and
when, etc. This has been explored in other works already [3],
2http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/. Accessed: 2019-02-10.
[10], [16]–[18]. To our knowledge, we are the first to expose
this type of weakness in DGA classifiers that do not use
side information. We would, therefore, recommend that the
community focuses its research efforts on DGA classifiers that
utilize side information and not just rely on the domain name
string by itself.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
gives an overview of related work in the field of adversarial
machine learning. Section III details the CharBot algorithm.
Section IV describes the data sets we used for the experiments.
Section V outlines our experiments and discusses their results,
as well as several ways we could defend against CharBot
attacks. Section VII concludes the work and lists some possi-
bilities for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine learning approaches that leverage the domain
name string for DGA detection can be categorized into two
groups: (1) so-called “featureful” methods that rely on human
defined lexical features extracted from the domain names,
such as domain name length, vowel-character ratio, bigrams,
etc. [2], [11], [16] and (2) “featureless” methods in which
the automatic discovery of good features is part of the over-
all machine learning model training process, as a form of
representation learning [4]–[7], [9], [19]. Popular kinds of
classifiers used in the featureful approach for DGA detection
are logistic regression and tree ensemble methods, while the
featureless approach relies on the use of deep neural networks,
namely Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks and
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Most papers about
the featureless approach include a featureful approach as a
baseline method [4]–[8], [12], [13], [19], and the featureless
approach is typically reported to yield better, more accurate
results.
A natural response of malware authors to machine learning
classifiers for DGA detection is to try to purposely craft
domain names that will be mislabeled as benign by the
classifiers. This kind of evasion attack is studied as part of the
broader field of adversarial machine learning (AML) [20]. In
this setting, an intelligent adversary aims to exploit weaknesses
in a machine learning model in order to obtain desired (ille-
gitimate) outcomes. A prototypical example is that of spam
classification, where the adversary attempts to craft spam e-
mails that evade detectors while still achieving the desired
results. Seminal contributions in this area include the work of
Dalvi et al. [21] as well as the papers by Lowd and Meek [22],
[23], who study classical machine learning algorithms such as
linear classifiers, naive Bayes, support vector machines and
maximum entropy filters. More recent works primarily study
AML for deep neural networks [24]–[26].
A recent innovation in the area of deep learning and
generative modeling, is the Generative Adversarial Network
or GAN, first proposed by Goodfellow et al. [27]. In the
GAN framework, a generative model is trained by pitting
it against an adversary. The adversary is a discriminative
model whose goal is to discern whether a given sample came
from the data generating distribution or from the generative
3model. The generator is trained to maximize the loss of the
discriminator, so the GAN training procedure corresponds
to a two-player minimax game. Ideally, when the training
converges, the generator should recover the data generating
distribution and the discriminator should not be able to do
any better than random guessing.
GANs have found several uses in cybersecurity by now.
Anderson et al. [14] proposed DeepDGA, which is a generative
model for DGA domains trained using a GAN. They find that
adding samples from DeepDGA to the training data of deep
learning based DGA classifiers improves their performance
against unseen malware families, aiding generalization of the
models when insufficient training data is available. In the field
of password security, Hitaj et al. [28] have proposed PassGAN,
another generative model trained in the GAN framework. Pass-
GAN learns to capture the distribution of human passwords
and is able to surpass state of the art tools for password
guessing. Hu and Tan [29] recently proposed MalGAN, a GAN
with which they are able to construct malware samples that
can bypass black-box machine learning methods. Their attack
is particularly striking because they are able to reduce malware
detection rates to almost zero without requiring direct access
to the detectors they aim to evade. Moreover, they found
that explicitly retraining the detectors on MalGAN samples
is ineffective: MalGAN can easily be adapted to take this
retraining into account, bypassing the retrained models again
with almost 100% success. With CharBot, we achieve similar
(and, in several cases, better) results with a much simpler
approach that can actually be incorporated within a piece of
malware, in contrast to deep-learning based methods which
are usually too large or too computationally intensive.
Several authors have recently looked into the automatic
generation of URLs for phishing. To this end, Bahnsen et
al. [30] create a text consisting of known phishing URLs from
PhishTank3 and use it to train an LSTM for text generation,
i.e. given a small seed sentence, predict the next characters
iteratively. They report that this technique generates examples
that are not detected by their own LSTM based phishing URL
classifier [31]. Anand et al. [32] trained a GAN – containing a
character based LSTM as part of its architecture – to generate
synthetic phishing URLs to augment the training data for
feature-based phishing URL detection classifiers. The problem
they address is the class imbalance in typical training data sets,
which contain many more examples of benign URLs than of
phishing URLs. Instead of adding all generated phishing URLs
as positive examples to their training data, they first map the
generated URLs to their corresponding feature vectors, and
select “representative samples” based on Euclidean distance
in this feature space. In a similar vein to Anand et al., Burns
et al. [33] train a GAN on OpenPhish4, PhishTank and DNS-
BH5 data sources to develop synthetic phishing domains.
They compare a random forest classifier trained on Alexa
and Umbrella6 data sets to models that were augmented with
3https://www.phishtank.com/. Accessed: 2019-02-08.
4https://openphish.com/. Accessed: 2019-02-08.
5http://www.malwaredomains.com/. Accessed: 2019-02-08.
6http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html. Accessed:
2019-02-08.
samples generated by the GAN. They find that the augmented
models appear to have consistently higher test set accuracy
than the original classifier.
URLs intended for phishing are quite different in nature than
DGA domains for C&C purposes. Indeed, to be successful,
phishing URLs need to deceive humans, which requires them
to be as indistinguishable as possible from benign URLs to the
human observer. DGA domain names used for C&C purposes
are not intended at all to be read by human users. DGA
domain names are successful if they can evade DGA classifiers
and have not been previously registered, i.e. they should be
available for the botmaster to register. To the best of our
knowledge, so far Anderson et al. are the only ones who have
looked into generative modeling of DGA domain names [14].
Although their results are significant, we show in this work
that classifiers which have been adversarially trained using
DeepDGA remain vulnerable to simple attacks such as the
CharBot algorithm we propose in section III.
The CharBot algorithm is a black-box targeted evasion
attack that works against tree ensembles and neural networks.
“Black-box” refers to the fact that our CharBot DGA does
not require details of the classifiers in order to work: it can
attack any model trained on any data set and succeed with
high probability. It is a targeted attack because we want the
classifiers to output a specific class in response to our DGA
samples, namely benign. Untargeted attacks, on the other hand,
merely aim to change the classification to any class other
than the original; for example, an untargeted attack would
also count a change from benign to malicious as a success,
whereas in our scenario that would be unacceptable. Finally,
CharBot is an evasion attack because it occurs at test time,
when the model is already trained and deployed. This is in
contrast to poisoning attacks which occur at training time
and work by corrupting samples in the training data set in
order to deliberately introduce weaknesses into the model [20].
The CharBot attack itself is inspired by typosquatting, a well-
known technique used by phishers and social engineers [34].
Typosquatting involves taking a legitimate domain and in-
troducing a few typographical errors that are unlikely to
be noticed by human users (e.g., changing google.com into
g0ogle.com). Whereas a priori one would think that typosquat-
ting exploits an inherently human vulnerability, we make the
surprising discovery that state-of-the-art DGA classifiers are
actually vulnerable to such techniques as well.
Similarly to our work here, Spooren et al. [15] developed
DeceptionDGA, a novel DGA which incorporates knowledge
of the features used by a DGA classifier in order to attack
it. They report significant reductions in predictive accuracy
for the FANCI model as well as the Endgame LSTM by
Woodbridge et al. [4]. The DeceptionDGA algorithm is more
complicated than CharBot, requiring knowledge of the under-
lying model in order to deploy it. Despite this difference in
complexity, the detection rates we observe for CharBot in our
experiments are comparable to those of DeceptionDGA.
We also wish to acknowledge the concurrent work of [35]
who describe MaskDGA, a black-box technique for evading
DGA classifiers that is similar to CharBot. MaskDGA makes
use of a surrogate model as well as a list of DGA domains.
4It uses these data to craft character-level perturbations of the
malicious domains such that they are no longer recognized by
the surrogate model. Similarly to our own results, the authors
find that such techniques are highly effective at reducing
the accuracy of state-of-the-art DGA classifiers. They also
make the recommendation that DGA classifiers should rely on
additional side-information whenever this is possible in order
to mitigate adversarial attacks.
III. CHARBOT
CharBot is a character-based DGA intended to show how
successful a simplistic DGA based on small perturbations can
be at evading detection by state-of-the-art classifiers. Without
loss of generality, throughout this paper we consider domains
consisting of a second-level domain (SLD) and a top-level
domain (TLD), separated by a dot, as in e.g. wikipedia.org.
CharBot requires the following inputs:
• A list of legitimate domain names. In our case, ten
thousand Alexa domains with a second-level domain
(SLD) length of six or greater are used.
• A list of top-level domains (TLDs).
• A date to be used as a seed for pseudorandomization.
With these inputs, CharBot (1) selects a domain from the
provided list, (2) selects two characters from the SLD, and
(3) selects two replacement characters. The replacement char-
acters are chosen from an equal distribution of DNS-valid
characters — the alphanumeric characters and the dash —
and the algorithm ensures the characters selected from the
SLD are different from the replacement characters. Finally,
CharBot (4) appends a TLD to the new domain by selecting
one of the following: com, at, uk, pl, be, biz, co, jp, cz, de,
eu, fr, info, it, ru, lv, me, name, net, nz, org, us. Pseudocode
is given in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: CharBot
Data: a list of SLDs D, a list of TLDs T , a seed s
Result: a DGA domain
1 Initialize the pseudorandom generator with the seed s.
2 Randomly select a SLD d from D.
3 Randomly select two indices i and j so that
1 ≤ i, j ≤ |d|.
4 Randomly select two replacement characters c1 and c2
from the set of DNS-valid characters.
5 Set d[i]← c1 and d[j]← c2.
6 Randomly select a TLD t from T .
7 return d.t
A DGA is successful if it can generate many unique
domains that have not yet been registered and which are not
flagged by DGA classifiers as malicious. CharBot draws its
replacement characters from a uniform distribution. Therefore,
the more characters we replace, the more the generated do-
mains resemble random strings. This increases the detection
rate by DGA classifiers, so we aim to keep the number of
replacement characters minimal. We tested several choices for
the number of characters to be replaced. We found that two
characters strike an appropriate balance between the rate of
detection by DGA classifiers and the probability that a domain
is already registered: with two characters, domains are flagged
slightly more often but almost all domains are unregistered
(see table I); when replacing only a single character, detection
rates go down but more domains turn out to be registered
already.
Adversarial attacks such as CharBot are always accompa-
nied by an adversarial cost function c(x, x˜) which describes
the cost associated with perturbing an “ideal” sample x into a
sample x˜ that the adversary can actually use. For image classi-
fication, it is common to use `p distances for this purpose [24],
[26], [36]. However, in our context, the cost of perturbing a
correctly classified benign domain x into a malicious domain
x˜ that is classified as benign must be measured differently, as
we are working in a discrete input space (text) instead of a
continuous one (images). Specifically, it makes sense to define
our cost function as follows:
c(x, x˜) =
{
dL(x, x˜) if x˜ is unregistered,
∞ otherwise.
Here, dL denotes the Levenshtein distance or edit dis-
tance [37]. The cost function c(x, x˜) increases with the number
of edits (insertions, deletions, and substitutions) required to
transform x into x˜, as each edit makes the attack more
detectable by DGA classifiers. However, there is an infinitely
large cost associated with generating a domain that is already
registered, since such domains cannot be used by the attacker
at all and may cause the malware to malfunction. CharBot
was designed to minimize this cost function efficiently and as
simply as possible.
We note that obvious extensions of the CharBot algorithm
are possible. For example, we could additionally implement
insertions of new characters and deletions of existing charac-
ters. The number of characters might also be chosen adaptively
based on some heuristic instead of fixed in advance. However,
we chose to limit ourselves to only substituting a fixed
number of characters since this simple strategy already gives
us very good results. Moreover, simpler attacks are likely to
be preferred by attackers and therefore constitute a greater
security concern.
The only obstacle to the deployment of CharBot in real
malware might be its size. We implemented CharBot in 17,983
bytes of Python code. The Alexa data set it requires takes
up 145,008 additional bytes, although the public availability
of this data set means it could be downloaded on the fly.
Therefore, we would need at most 162,991 bytes for a full
implementation of CharBot with Alexa included. By compar-
ison, the DeepDGA algorithm [14] requires to embed in the
malware a trained machine learning model that takes up at
least 6,539,192 bytes. This is about 40× larger than CharBot.
We therefore feel that file size is no obstacle to deploying
CharBot in real malware.
IV. DATA SETS
We use three different kinds of data in our experiments:
a) Alexa: The top 1 million unique domain names from
Alexa7. Alexa ranks websites based on their popularity in
7https://www.alexa.com, Accessed 2019-02-08.
5terms of the number of page views and number of unique
visitors. It only retains the websites’ SLD and TLD, ag-
gregating across any subdomains. For example, according
to Alexa, the five highest ranked domain names in terms
of popularity on 2019-02-06 are google.com, youtube.com,
facebook.com, baidu.com and wikipedia.org. It is generally
assumed that the top 1 million domain names in the Alexa
ranking are “benign” domain names in the sense that they
were not created by a DGA. Of course, this does not mean
that the domain is “benign” in the sense of not being used
for malicious activity. Indeed, there is reason to believe that a
significant number of Alexa top ranked domains are used for
malicious purposes [38], but this is not the problem we are
considering here. In our setting, we only consider a domain
to be “malicious” if it was generated by a DGA.
b) Bambenek: 1 million unique DGA domain names
from the Bambenek Consulting feeds8 for 3 different days,
namely Jun 24, Jul 22, Jul 23, 2017. These feeds contain
DGA domain names from specific malware families that were
observed in real traffic on those days. Such domain names can
be collected by reverse engineering a known malware family,
generating lists of domain names with the reverse engineered
malware, and checking which of these domain names also
occur in real traffic.
c) Qname: 1 million unique domain names originating
from a real-time stream of passive DNS data that consists
of roughly 10-12 billion DNS queries per day collected
from subscribers including ISPs (Internet Service Providers),
schools, and businesses. We annotated this stream based on
a set of heuristic filtering rules following [7]. Specifically,
we labeled as benign all domains that (1) have been resolved
at least twice, (2) never resulted in an NXDomain response
and (3) span more than 30 days. Here, span is defined as
the number of days between the first and last successfully
resolved query for a given domain. We randomly sampled 1
million such domains that appeared in DNS traffic between
September 2015 and August 2018. This data set is weakly
labeled since the heuristic filtering rules do not guarantee
that the domains are actually benign or malicious; however,
we believe it to be a useful approximation.
The Alexa and Qname data sets serve as our negative
(benign) examples, whereas Bambenek serves as our set of
positive (malicious) examples. Alexa and Qname have pre-
cisely 537 domains in common, which is a negligible number
compared to the total sizes of the data sets, therefore making
Qname a good data set to test transferability of CharBot.
We refer to the combination of Alexa and Bambenek data
as AlexaBamb and similarly for QnameBamb. These data sets
consist of 2 million samples each, 1 million per class.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We perform experiments on two DGA classifiers that
are considered state of the art at the time of this writing:
FANCI [11] and LSTM.MI [5], as well as a third model we call
B-RF based on the work by [12]. All classifiers are trained to
8http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds/, Accessed 2019-02-08
label a domain name as either benign (negative) or malicious
(positive). We find that the best results overall are achieved
with the deep learning based LSTM.MI approach, followed by
the random forest-based B-RF approach, and finally the ran-
dom forest-based FANCI method. The difference in predictive
accuracy between the various approaches is substantial. The
results hold across the AlexaBamb and QnameBamb data sets
(see table IV, and a more detailed discussion in section V-D).
To arrive at the results, we train on the AlexaBamb data
set as well as on the QnameBamb data set with a 80%/20%
train/test split for each, reporting the true positive rate (TPR),
the partial area under the ROC curve (AUC) and the fraction of
samples from CharBot, DeepDGA and DeceptionDGA which
the models were able to detect (see table IV and table V).
All of these metrics are reported at FPRs of 0.1% and 1%.9
The AUC@0.1%FPR is the integral of the ROC curve from
FPR = 0 to FPR = 0.001 on the test data, and similarly for
the AUC@1%FPR. We repeat all experiments on the original
models as well as the models after adversarial retraining.
To perform the adversarial retraining, we utilized the data
sets shown in table I. Specifically, we used CharBot and Deep-
DGA with different seeds to generate training and testing data
sets. The training data sets were used to augment the original
training data of the classifiers; the testing data sets were used
to verify their performance. For DeceptionDGA, Spooren et
al. [15] supplied a list of 150,000 domains generated by their
algorithm from which we sampled our training and testing
data. Note that, based on a random sample of 500 domains10,
CharBot has the highest fraction of unregistered domains
(100%), followed by DeepDGA (99.8%) and DeceptionDGA
(98.8%).
The experiments on the QnameBamb data set are intended
to investigate the transferability of CharBot. All CharBot
domain names used in the experiments (see table I) are created
by CharBot by corrupting domain names from the Alexa data
set. This might leave DGA classifiers that are trained on
AlexaBamb extra vulnerable to CharBot attacks. A natural
question to ask is whether CharBot can also successfully
bypass DGA classifiers that were trained on a data set different
from Alexa, one CharBot has no access to. To test this, we
trained LSTM.MI, FANCI, and B-RF on the QnameBamb data
and reported the same statistics as for AlexaBamb.
Below we give a brief description of the LSTM.MI, FANCI,
and B-RF classifiers, followed by detailed results (section V-D)
and a discussion of possible countermeasures for defending
against small perturbations attacks such as CharBot (section
VI).
A. LSTM.MI
Woodbridge et al. [4] were the first to propose deep learning
for DGA domain name detection. Their DGA classifier is a
neural network consisting of an embedding layer, an LSTM
9A low false positive rate is very important in deployed DGA detection
systems because blocking legitimate traffic is highly undesirable. The thresh-
old of 0.1% FPR was chosen because this rate is often used by real-world
models in practice, whereas 1% is the largest FPR that could still be useful.
10We limited ourselves to a random sample of 500 domains to avoid getting
blocked by ISPs.
6DGA Data Set Seeds Used # Unique Synthetic Domains # Unregistered Domains (out of 500 sampled)
CharBot Training 2018-12-04 100,000 500 (100%)Testing 2019-01-01 10,000 500 (100%)
DeepDGA Training 2018-12-04 100,000 499 (99.8%)Testing 2019-01-01 10,000 499 (99.8%)
DeceptionDGA Training N/A 100,000 494 (98.8%)Testing N/A 10,000 494 (98.8%)
TABLE I
ADVERSARIAL DATA SETS
# Feature FANCI B-RF
1 Domain name length 3 3
2 Second level domain length 7 3
3 Top level domain length 7 3
4 Domain Unique Characters length 7 3
5 SLD Unique Characters length 7 3
6 TLD Unique Characters length 7 3
7 Has malicious TLD 7 3
8 Has Valid TLD 3 7
9 TLD Hash 7 3
10 Contains Digits 3 7
11 Starts with Digit 7 3
12 Underscore Ratio* 3 7
13 Symbol ratio 7 3
14 Hex ratio 7 3
15 Digit Ratio* 3 3
16 Vowel Ratio* 3 3
17 Consonant Ratio 7 3
18 Ratio of Repeated Characters* 3 3
19 Ratio of Consecutive Consonants* 3 3
20 Ratio of Consecutive Digits* 3 3
21 Number of tokens in SLD 7 3
22 Number of digits in SLD 7 3
23 Entropy* 3 3
24 Gini Index 7 3
25 Classification error of characters 7 3
26 N-Gram Distribution* 3 7
27 2-Gram Median 7 3
28 3-Gram Median 7 3
29 2-Gram Circle Median 7 3
30 3-Gram Circle Median 7 3
31 Number of Subdomains** 3 7
32 Subdomain Length Mean** 3 7
33 Has www Prefix 3 7
34 Contains Single-Character Subdomain** 3 7
35 Is Exclusive Prefix Repetition 3 7
36 Contains TLD as Subdomain** 3 7
37 Ratio of Digit-Exclusive Subdomains** 3 7
38 Ratio of Hexadecimal-Exclusive Subdomains** 3 7
39 Contains IP Address** 3 7
40 Alphabet Cardinality* 3 7
TABLE II
FEATURES USED BY FANCI AND B-RF. (*) FOR THESE FEATURES,
FANCI USES DOT FREE PUBLIC-SUFFIX-FREE DOMAIN. (**) FOR THESE
FEATURES, FANCI USES PUBLIC-SUFFIX-FREE DOMAIN.
layer, and a single node output layer with sigmoid activation.
In this paper, we use the LSTM.MI model that was proposed
recently by Tran et al. [5]. Its architecture is very similar
to that of Woodbridge et al. [4]; the main distinction is that
the LSTM.MI model is trained with a cost-sensitive learning
algorithm that takes class imbalances into account. This allows
the LSTM.MI approach to achieve slightly better results than
the original LSTM approach (see [5], [12]). The code for
# Feature
31 Number of Subdomains
33 Has www Prefix
34 Contains Single-Character Subdomain
35 Is Exclusive Prefix Repetition
36 Contains TLD as Subdomain
TABLE III
FANCI FEATURES NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY EFFECT IN OUR
EXPERIMENTS
training the LSTM.MI model is publicly available.11
B. FANCI
The FANCI classifier recently proposed by Schu¨ppen et
al. [11] is a random forest (RF) classifier designed to clas-
sify NXDomains as benign (bNXD) or malicious (mAGD).
NXDomains, or Non-Existent Domains, are domains that can
not be resolved. DGAs generate hundreds or even thousands
of domains every day, only very few of which are actually
registered by the botmaster. That means that almost all queries
for DGA generated domains by infected machines will result
in an NXDomain response by the local DNS server, so it is
reasonable to attempt to detect DGA activity by analyzing
NXDomains.
To this end, the FANCI classifier leverages 21 manually
defined features, extracted from the domain name string. The
21 features can be divided into structural, linguistic, and
statistical categories (see table II). The FANCI RF model
is comprised of 9 decision trees, of which 7 use the Gini
coefficient as the measure of impurity and the other 2 use
entropy. Each tree takes between 2 to 18 features. The source
code of the FANCI classifier is available on GitHub.12
The domain names used in our experiments contain only
SLDs and TLDs (see section IV). As such, it is expected that
a number of features used in the FANCI model would not
make a distinction between malicious and benign examples.
Table III lists the FANCI features that are not expected to
have any effect.
C. B-RF
B-RF [12] is a random based DGA detection classifier that
is trained on 26 manually engineered features as indicated
in table II. There is some overlap between the features used
by FANCI and those used by B-RF. For instance, both make
11https://github.com/bkcs-hust/lstm-mi. Accessed: 2019-02-08.
12https://github.com/fanci-dga-detection/fanci. Accessed: 2019-02-08.
7use of the domain name length, digit and vowel ratio, ratio of
repeated characters, etc. Some features are used by FANCI but
not by B-RF, such as whether the domains have valid TLDs or
whether they contain digits. Other features like 2-gram median
and 3-gram median are only used by B-RF.
B-RF consists of 100 trees and each tree is trained using a
subset with a maximum of 20 features. Entropy is used as the
criterion to decide the split attribute while growing the trees
in the random forest.
D. Results
The predictive performance metrics are summarized in
table IV for false positive rates13 of 0.1% and 1%. Figure 1
shows ROC curves for the different models on the AlexaBamb
data. We plot the ROC curve only for FPRs between 0 and
0.01, as higher FPRs are meaningless in practice. We conclude
from these results that the deep learning approach does better
than the RF approaches, which is in line with what has been
reported before in the literature [4]–[7], [13]. Among the RF
models, B-RF outperforms FANCI significantly. We found that
this improvement was not due to the number of trees, as
decreasing the number of trees used by B-RF from 100 to
9 (as in FANCI) still yielded superior performance for B-RF.
We therefore believe this difference in performance is caused
by the different feature sets.
We were unable to establish a classification threshold that
achieves 0.1% FPR for FANCI. Therefore, in reporting FANCI
results, we only consider FPR = 1%. We believe this is due to
the fact that [11] used proprietary data to filter classification
outcomes which increased accuracy. Our use of a different
post-filtering data set may be the reason for the difference
(note that the authors of the FANCI paper use accuracy
whereas we use AUC). For AlexaBamb and its augmented
datasets, we obtained between 90.7% and 91.4% accuracy.
For QnameBamb and its augmented datasets, we obtained
between 92.5% and 93.16% accuracy. This is not too far from
the 93.7% that was reported in [15] where the authors also
attempted to replicate the FANCI results.
All models fail to adequately detect CharBot and Decep-
tionDGA domains even when explicitly trained on them. The
LSTM.MI model succeeds in detecting DeepDGA close to
99% of the time with adversarial training, but the other
models generally fail at detecting DeepDGA as well. Training
on Qname instead of Alexa makes a significant difference,
both in predictive performance as well as detection rate:
the models have lower predictive accuracy when trained on
Qname, but they are better able to detect CharBot domains.
At the 0.1% FPR, however, these detection rates are nowhere
near high enough to be useful in practice. FANCI is unable
to properly detect CharBot at 1% FPR, whereas LSTM.MI
and B-RF sometimes manage to obtain over 80% detection
rate here. This is not a very useful result, however, since 1%
FPR is considered too high to be practical. Therefore, at a
13One can argue that even a FPR of 0.1% is still too high to be useful
in practice. While this can certainly be true depending on the application,
note that lower FPRs can only make our results better as the models will
necessarily have lower TPR and lower detection rates for CharBot.
low FPR, the domains generated by CharBot can be said to
be transferable across different models and data sets in the
sense that CharBot can fool models that have vastly different
architectures and are not trained on Alexa. Combined with its
simplicity, speed and small size, this makes CharBot an ideal
DGA for use in malware in the wild.
The success of CharBot may be explained as follows. The
algorithm works by taking the Alexa list of benign domains —
which most DGA classifiers would overwhelmingly classify as
such — and introduces a small number of typographical errors.
The statistical properties of the domains generated by CharBot
are therefore likely almost identical to those of Alexa, causing
a low detection rate. The transferability may be explained
by noting that even though Alexa and Qname are different
data sets, they still capture the same underlying distribution:
namely, that of benign domains. This closeness in distribution
is most likely shared among all sufficiently large corpora of
benign domains, allowing CharBot to fool any DGA classifier
that only takes the domain name string into account. We test
this hypothesis by performing kernel density estimation on the
feature distributions of the Alexa domains and the adversarial
domains. The results are plotted in figure 2. The Entropy
and Gini index features are standard impurity measures for
decision trees. The other features are:
• 2gram Median. This feature takes the median frequency
from the list of 2gram frequencies for the given SLD. Bi-
gram frequencies are collected from the Python package
called wordfreq 14.
• 3gram Median. 3gram median is similar to 2gram median
except that it returns the median frequency from the list
of trigram frequencies for the given SLD.
• Symbol ratio. This feature defines the ratio of non-
alphabetical characters in the SLD, which includes digits
and special characters.
• Consecutive Consonant Ratio. This feature defines the
ratio of consecutive consonants in the SLD.
From the plots, we observe that the feature distributions of
CharBot domains are much closer to those of Alexa than the
distributions of DeepDGA are. However, DeceptionDGA is
more similar to Alexa than CharBot is, although the difference
is very small in some cases. Nevertheless, CharBot gets quite
close to Alexa, which explains why it is so successful in
fooling DGA classifiers. It also shows that defending against
CharBot may be very difficult, potentially requiring a very
high FPR. Figure 2 also provides insights into what parts of
CharBot may be improved to yield an even more effective
DGA:
• The entropy curve of CharBot can be made more similar
to that of Alexa domains by using a different replacement
character distribution. Currently, we are using the uni-
form distribution, which has the highest possible entropy.
Switching to a lower entropy distribution may improve
the performance of CharBot, although this would need
to be carefully balanced against the probability of a
generated domain already being registered.
14https://pypi.org/project/wordfreq/1.1/. Accessed: 2019-02-14.
8Classifier Data set FPR=0.001 FPR=0.01
TPR AUC TPR AUC
LSTM.MI
AlexaBamb 96.79% 94.91% 99.27% 98.89%
AlexaBamb + CharBot 95.50% 95.35% 98.89% 98.67%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA 96.65% 96.44% 99.20% 99.00%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA 95.17% 95.05% 98.54% 98.46%
QnameBamb 81.98% 83.37% 98.98% 96.68%
QnameBamb + CharBot 82.91% 84.98% 98.51% 96.48%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA 83.22% 83.98% 98.85% 96.50%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA 84.66% 85.57% 98.61% 96.82%
FANCI
AlexaBamb — — 74.46% 80.46%
AlexaBamb + CharBot — — 72.49% 78.71%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA — — 73.98% 80.02%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA — — 73.84% 80.18%
QnameBamb — — 74.13% 79.06%
QnameBamb + CharBot — — 72.13% 77.80%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA — — 72.89% 78.19%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA — — 73.65% 78.86%
B-RF
AlexaBamb 85.72% 82.93% 94.72% 94.67%
AlexaBamb + CharBot 84.62% 79.30% 93.89% 93.75%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA 85.81% 80.94% 94.39% 94.35%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA 84.51% 78.62% 93.78% 93.73%
QnameBamb 82.75% 73.85% 96.88% 94.52%
QnameBamb + CharBot 83.03% 74.98% 96.37% 94.29%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA 82.64% 73.87% 96.39% 94.26%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA 82.98% 76.26% 96.26% 94.56%
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE METRICS OF LSTM.MI, FANCI AND B-RF ON THE DIFFERENT DATA SETS.
Classifier Data set FPR=0.001 FPR=0.01
CharBot DeepDGA DeceptionDGA CharBot DeepDGA DeceptionDGA
LSTM.MI
AlexaBamb 5.58% 33.98% 4.02% 15.50% 39.53% 12.74%
AlexaBamb + CharBot 55.19% 92.54% 19.69% 81.08% 98.44% 47.67%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA 12.39% 98.35% 7.34% 12.39% 98.35% 7.34%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA 23.59% 88.71% 40.29% 52.18% 96.66% 71.52%
QnameBamb 15.25% 6.18% 16.61% 31.90% 19.51% 37.73%
QnameBamb + CharBot 52.67% 42.48% 34.45% 81.96% 85.90% 66.27%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA 27.84% 94.51% 24.25% 43.28% 99.61% 47.33%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA 30.45% 15.97% 37.74% 53.31% 37.97% 24.25%
FANCI
AlexaBamb — — — 3.05% 6.33% 1.66%
AlexaBamb + CharBot — — — 22.26% 12.12% 2.64%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA — — — 6.45% 83.17% 2.08%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA — — — 4.27% 6.57% 2.33%
QnameBamb — — — 21.43% 5.37% 46.85%
QnameBamb + CharBot — — — 48.44% 14.20% 49.62%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA — — — 45.13% 77.88% 50.11%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA — — — 44.75% 13.77% 50.45%
B-RF
AlexaBamb 1.69% 6.61% 1.38% 27.59% 23.97% 22.37%
AlexaBamb + CharBot 1.84% 9.19% 1.20% 64.33% 34.06% 41.22%
AlexaBamb + DeepDGA 4.54% 46.55% 2.86% 31.80% 84.12% 26.86%
AlexaBamb + DeceptionDGA 2.00% 8.23% 1.34% 33.14% 24.51% 32.53%
QnameBamb 18.80% 2.99% 41.67% 61.05% 22.57% 62.31%
QnameBamb + CharBot 43.47% 12.54% 49.18% 85.82% 60.70% 79.33%
QnameBamb + DeepDGA 44.04% 33.08% 49.80% 65.97% 98.84% 67.79%
QnameBamb + DeceptionDGA 39.97% 10.53% 47.86% 62.29% 23.30% 67.74%
TABLE V
DETECTION RATES OF THE DIFFERENT DGAS.
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Fig. 1. ROC curves for the classifiers trained on the AlexaBamb data set.
• The random replacement of two characters caused the
2-gram distributions of CharBot to differ from those of
the Alexa domains. We can overcome this weakness by
replacing neighboring characters with 2-grams that occur
frequently in Alexa. A similar line of reasoning applies
to 3-grams.
• The symbol ratio distributions can be made more similar
by drawing c1 and c2 from the same letters or digit sets
of the original domain. For example, replace a digit with
another random digit and not with a letter.
Investigating the lengths of the domain names that were
generated vs. those that are present in the Alexa and Qname
data sets (see table VI), we find that CharBot names are close
in length to Alexa names (which is to be expected), but Qname,
Bambenek and DeepDGA domains are significantly longer on
average, whereas DeceptionDGA are significantly shorter. This
difference in lengths may contribute to the detection rates:
when training on Alexa, CharBot domains are similar in length
whereas DeepDGA domains are longer like the Bambenek
domains. By contrast, when training on Qname, domains are
longer on average, which aids detection of CharBot (although
the difference is not very large).
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
We consider a few options for defending against attacks
such as CharBot:
A. Comparing incoming domains to Alexa
The simplest defense against CharBot would be to take
the domain in question and compare it to the full Alexa list.
If the domain is equal to one found in the Alexa list save
for one or two replaced characters, the domain is flagged as
malicious. However, the Alexa data set contains one million
samples, so this approach of computing the Hamming distance
of input domains on the fly may not be practical. We can
make this computation even harder by modifying CharBot
to perform deletions and insertions, forcing the use of the
edit distance [37] rather than the Hamming one. Practical
implementations can reduce lookup time by pre-computing
noisy versions of the Alexa list into a compact data structure
such as a Bloom filter [39]. However, this approach is marred
by a combinatorial explosion of possible corrupted domain
names based on the Alexa data set: if we let n be the size
of the CharBot data set, ` be the average length of a domain
name, k be the number of edits CharBot introduces and m
be the size of the replacement alphabet, then the number of
possible domains CharBot can generate is given approximately
by
n
(
`
k
)
(m− 1)k.
For n = 10, 000, ` = 16, m = 40 and k = 2 this yields
1,825,200,000 possible domains. Besides, this defense can also
easily be defeated by simply using a different legitimate data
set instead of Alexa for generating domain names.
B. Increasing the capacity of the models
Using more complicated classification models may allow
them to find a meaningful separation between Alexa and
CharBot domains. However, this would require careful feature
engineering for featureful models and increase the computa-
tional burden of both model training and inference. Given that
practical DGA classifiers need to be regularly retrained to keep
up with new malware and they need to process many domains
in real-time, this may not be feasible. Nevertheless, this may
be an option worth exploring in future work.
C. White-box adversarial training
Our adversarial training procedure in this paper has con-
sisted of generating a list of adversarial domains once and
then augmenting the training data with them. However, adver-
sarial training is usually done iteratively: at every iteration of
training, the current batch of training samples is augmented
with adversarially generated set specifically for the model
at that particular stage [24], [25]. This requires a white-
box attack which is able to take the model parameters into
account. Adversarial attacks have mostly been considered
in the image domain, although there is some work on text
classification [40], [41]. Making use of this recent body of
work on white-box adversarial training for text classification
may allow us to improve the detection rate of CharBot.
D. Using side information
Perhaps the most realistic defense against attacks like
CharBot would be to use additional information besides the
domain name string alone. For instance, the IP addresses the
domain maps to, how often the domain was queried and when,
etc. There have been several works investigating the use of
such information in DGA classification [3], [10], [16]–[18]. A
fruitful avenue for future work could be to test whether these
classifiers are more resilient to CharBot.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed CharBot, a simple and efficient DGA.
We have shown CharBot to be effective at both generating
large amounts of unregistered domain names as well as fooling
three DGA classifiers: FANCI, LSTM.MI and B-RF. We also
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Fig. 2. Kernel density estimation of the feature distributions of Alexa and adversarial domain names.
Data Set Mean Standard Deviation
Alexa 14.30 4.70
Bambenek 21.80 6.42
Qname 23.99 7.97
CharBot 14.27 4.02
DeepDGA 28.52 9.06
DeceptionDGA 10.20 3.90
TABLE VI
STATISTICS OF THE DOMAIN NAME LENGTHS FOR EACH DATA SET.
compared CharBot to DeepDGA and DeceptionDGA, two
state-of-the-art domain generation algorithms. The domain
names generated by CharBot were more likely to be unregis-
tered than those generated by DeepDGA or DeceptionDGA.
Moreover, adversarial retraining using CharBot, DeepDGA or
DeceptionDGA did not result in adequate detection of CharBot
domains names.
Our DGA is the very first example of a black-box adver-
sarial machine learning attack against DGA classifiers that is
not based on Generative Adversarial Networks. We show that
simply introducing small perturbations to a set of legitimate
domains is good enough and such advanced techniques are
unnecessary. We believe this highlights a dangerous weakness
of modern DGA classifiers, namely their vulnerability to
extremely simple attacks that make no use of sophisticated
machine learning techniques. CharBot is an algorithm that
could be realistically used in malware in the wild to circum-
vent state of the art DGA classifiers, making it a real threat.
We speculate that this vulnerability is actually inherent to any
classifier that relies only on the domain name string to perform
DGA classification. The CharBot DGA is similar to dictionary
DGAs: both have a list of strings embedded as part of the DGA
code. In the case of dictionary DGAs this list is a dictionary
of words that are combined in various ways to generate a
domain name, while in the case of CharBot the list contains
benign domain names that are altered slightly to generate a
new domain name for malicious purposes. In both cases, the
generated domain names exhibit properties that are very close
to natural language, which makes them extremely difficult to
distinguish from benign domain names.
Machine learning models that attempt to do DGA classifi-
cation based only on the domain name itself, such as the ones
considered in this paper, might not be sufficient to detect a
DGA like CharBot. The result highlights the need for ML
models that exploit additional context features such as the
IP-addresses that the domains are mapped to, or temporal
access patterns (e.g. how often the domain was requested, and
when) [3], [16]–[18], as was done successfully for dictionary
DGAs [10].
For future work, we focus on defending DGA classifiers
against simple attacks such as CharBot. The avenues we are
investigating to achieve this include performing white-box
adversarial training as well as augmenting the model inputs
with side information that is more difficult to manipulate.
REPRODUCIBILITY
To foster reproducibility of our results, we are open to
sharing all of our code as well as data sets of CharBot samples
upon request.
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